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For SIP REGISTER fix domain-only URIs and domain ACL bypass.

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The code that allowed admins to create users with domain-only uri's had
stopped to work in 1.8 because of the reqresp parser rewrites. This is
fixed now: if you have a [mydomain.com] sip user, you can register with
useraddr sip:mydomain.com. Note that in that case -- if you're using
domain ACLs (a configured domain list) -- mydomain.com must be in the
allow list as well.

Reviewboard r1606 shows a list of registration combinations and which
SIP response codes are returned.

Review: https://reviewboard.asterisk.org/r/1533/
Reviewed by: Terry Wilson

(closes issue ASTERISK-18389)
(closes issue ASTERISK-18741)


git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/branches/1.8@346899 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3
This commit is contained in:
Walter Doekes
2011-12-04 09:57:02 +00:00
parent 7e7e263652
commit fb00056373
1 changed files with 70 additions and 39 deletions
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105
channels/chan_sip.c
View File

@@ -13632,7 +13632,12 @@ static int parse_ok_contact(struct sip_pvt *pvt, struct sip_request *req)
return TRUE;
}
/*! \brief parse uri in a way that allows semicolon stripping if legacy mode is enabled */
/*! \brief parse uri in a way that allows semicolon stripping if legacy mode is enabled
*
* \note This calls parse_uri which has the unexpected property that passing more
* arguments results in more splitting. Most common is to leave out the pass
* argument, causing user to contain user:pass if available.
*/
static int parse_uri_legacy_check(char *uri, const char *scheme, char **user, char **pass, char **hostport, char **transport)
{
int ret = parse_uri(uri, scheme, user, pass, hostport, transport);
@@ -14492,7 +14497,7 @@ static enum check_auth_result register_verify(struct sip_pvt *p, struct ast_sock
enum check_auth_result res = AUTH_NOT_FOUND;
struct sip_peer *peer;
char tmp[256];
char *name = NULL, *c, *domain = NULL, *dummy = NULL;
char *c, *name, *unused_password, *domain;
char *uri2 = ast_strdupa(uri);
terminate_uri(uri2);
@@ -14502,7 +14507,7 @@ static enum check_auth_result register_verify(struct sip_pvt *p, struct ast_sock
c = get_in_brackets(tmp);
c = remove_uri_parameters(c);
if (parse_uri_legacy_check(c, "sip:,sips:", &name, &dummy, &domain, NULL)) {
if (parse_uri_legacy_check(c, "sip:,sips:", &name, &unused_password, &domain, NULL)) {
ast_log(LOG_NOTICE, "Invalid to address: '%s' from %s (missing sip:) trying to use anyway...\n", c, ast_sockaddr_stringify_addr(addr));
return -1;
}
@@ -14512,12 +14517,34 @@ static enum check_auth_result register_verify(struct sip_pvt *p, struct ast_sock
extract_host_from_hostport(&domain);
/*! \todo XXX here too we interpret a missing @domain as a name-only
* URI, whereas the RFC says this is a domain-only uri.
*/
if (!ast_strlen_zero(domain) && !AST_LIST_EMPTY(&domain_list)) {
if (ast_strlen_zero(domain)) {
/* <sip:name@[EMPTY]>, never good */
transmit_response(p, "404 Not found", &p->initreq);
return AUTH_UNKNOWN_DOMAIN;
}
if (ast_strlen_zero(name)) {
/* <sip:[EMPTY][@]hostport>, unsure whether valid for
* registration. RFC 3261, 10.2 states:
* "The To header field and the Request-URI field typically
* differ, as the former contains a user name."
* But, Asterisk has always treated the domain-only uri as a
* username: we allow admins to create accounts described by
* domain name. */
name = domain;
}
/* This here differs from 1.4 and 1.6: the domain matching ACLs were
* skipped if it was a domain-only URI (used as username). Here we treat
* <sip:hostport> as <sip:host@hostport> and won't forget to test the
* domain ACLs against host. */
if (!AST_LIST_EMPTY(&domain_list)) {
if (!check_sip_domain(domain, NULL, 0)) {
if (sip_cfg.alwaysauthreject) {
transmit_fake_auth_response(p, SIP_REGISTER, &p->initreq, XMIT_UNRELIABLE);
} else {
transmit_response(p, "404 Not found (unknown domain)", &p->initreq);
}
return AUTH_UNKNOWN_DOMAIN;
}
}
@@ -15059,7 +15086,7 @@ static int get_rdnis(struct sip_pvt *p, struct sip_request *oreq, char **name, c
*/
static enum sip_get_dest_result get_destination(struct sip_pvt *p, struct sip_request *oreq, int *cc_recall_core_id)
{
char tmp[256] = "", *uri, *domain, *dummy = NULL;
char tmp[256] = "", *uri, *unused_password, *domain;
char tmpf[256] = "", *from = NULL;
struct sip_request *req;
char *decoded_uri;
@@ -15075,7 +15102,7 @@ static enum sip_get_dest_result get_destination(struct sip_pvt *p, struct sip_re
uri = ast_strdupa(get_in_brackets(tmp));
if (parse_uri_legacy_check(uri, "sip:,sips:", &uri, &dummy, &domain, NULL)) {
if (parse_uri_legacy_check(uri, "sip:,sips:", &uri, &unused_password, &domain, NULL)) {
ast_log(LOG_WARNING, "Not a SIP header (%s)?\n", uri);
return SIP_GET_DEST_INVALID_URI;
}
@@ -15850,10 +15877,7 @@ static enum check_auth_result check_user_full(struct sip_pvt *p, struct sip_requ
int sipmethod, const char *uri, enum xmittype reliable,
struct ast_sockaddr *addr, struct sip_peer **authpeer)
{
char from[256] = { 0, };
char *dummy = NULL; /* dummy return value for parse_uri */
char *domain = NULL; /* dummy return value for parse_uri */
char *of;
char from[256] = "", *of, *name, *unused_password, *domain;
enum check_auth_result res = AUTH_DONT_KNOW;
char calleridname[50];
char *uri2 = ast_strdupa(uri);
@@ -15870,8 +15894,9 @@ static enum check_auth_result check_user_full(struct sip_pvt *p, struct sip_requ
return res;
}
if (calleridname[0])
if (calleridname[0]) {
ast_string_field_set(p, cid_name, calleridname);
}
if (ast_strlen_zero(p->exten)) {
char *t = uri2;
@@ -15893,32 +15918,36 @@ static enum check_auth_result check_user_full(struct sip_pvt *p, struct sip_requ
/* save the URI part of the From header */
ast_string_field_set(p, from, of);
/* ignore all fields but name */
if (parse_uri_legacy_check(of, "sip:,sips:", &of, &dummy, &domain, NULL)) {
if (parse_uri_legacy_check(of, "sip:,sips:", &name, &unused_password, &domain, NULL)) {
ast_log(LOG_NOTICE, "From address missing 'sip:', using it anyway\n");
}
SIP_PEDANTIC_DECODE(of);
SIP_PEDANTIC_DECODE(name);
SIP_PEDANTIC_DECODE(domain);
if (ast_strlen_zero(of)) {
/* XXX note: the original code considered a missing @host
* as a username-only URI. The SIP RFC (19.1.1) says that
* this is wrong, and it should be considered as a domain-only URI.
* For backward compatibility, we keep this block, but it is
* really a mistake and should go away.
*/
extract_host_from_hostport(&domain);
of = domain;
if (ast_strlen_zero(domain)) {
/* <sip:name@[EMPTY]>, never good */
ast_log(LOG_ERROR, "Empty domain name in FROM header\n");
return res;
}
if (ast_strlen_zero(name)) {
/* <sip:[EMPTY][@]hostport>. Asterisk 1.4 and 1.6 have always
* treated that as a username, so we continue the tradition:
* uri is now <sip:host@hostport>. */
name = domain;
} else {
char *tmp = ast_strdupa(of);
/* We need to be able to handle auth-headers looking like
/* Non-empty name, try to get caller id from it */
char *tmp = ast_strdupa(name);
/* We need to be able to handle from-headers looking like
<sip:8164444422;phone-context=+1@1.2.3.4:5060;user=phone;tag=SDadkoa01-gK0c3bdb43>
*/
tmp = strsep(&tmp, ";");
if (global_shrinkcallerid && ast_is_shrinkable_phonenumber(tmp))
if (global_shrinkcallerid && ast_is_shrinkable_phonenumber(tmp)) {
ast_shrink_phone_number(tmp);
}
ast_string_field_set(p, cid_num, tmp);
}
@@ -15932,20 +15961,22 @@ static enum check_auth_result check_user_full(struct sip_pvt *p, struct sip_requ
* pick one or another depending on the request ? XXX
*/
const char *hdr = get_header(req, "Authorization");
if (ast_strlen_zero(hdr))
if (ast_strlen_zero(hdr)) {
hdr = get_header(req, "Proxy-Authorization");
}
if (!ast_strlen_zero(hdr) && (hdr = strstr(hdr, "username=\""))) {
ast_copy_string(from, hdr + strlen("username=\""), sizeof(from));
of = from;
of = strsep(&of, "\"");
name = from;
name = strsep(&name, "\"");
}
}
res = check_peer_ok(p, of, req, sipmethod, addr,
res = check_peer_ok(p, name, req, sipmethod, addr,
authpeer, reliable, calleridname, uri2);
if (res != AUTH_DONT_KNOW)
if (res != AUTH_DONT_KNOW) {
return res;
}
/* Finally, apply the guest policy */
if (sip_cfg.allowguest) {
@@ -15958,11 +15989,11 @@ static enum check_auth_result check_user_full(struct sip_pvt *p, struct sip_requ
} else {
res = AUTH_RTP_FAILED;
}
} else if (sip_cfg.alwaysauthreject)
} else if (sip_cfg.alwaysauthreject) {
res = AUTH_FAKE_AUTH; /* reject with fake authorization request */
else
} else {
res = AUTH_SECRET_FAILED; /* we don't want any guests, authentication will fail */
}
if (ast_test_flag(&p->flags[1], SIP_PAGE2_RPORT_PRESENT)) {
ast_set_flag(&p->flags[0], SIP_NAT_RPORT_PRESENT);